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COMMENTS
EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST ENFORCE3ENT: THE
AMERICAN BANANA CASE A HALF CENTURY LATER
America's antitrust policy was first given statutory definition in the Sherman
Act. That act was aimed at restraints of trade "among the several states" and
also "with foreign nations." Initially it was open for the courts to determine
whether the words "with foreign nations" meant that our courts may take
jurisdiction over acts performed abroad, the effects of which may be to re-
strain United States commerce, or whether these words were merely intended
to extend the act's coverage to domestic activities in restraint of this country's
import or export trade. Complicating this question is the fact that no foreign
industrial nation has an exact counterpart to the Sherman Act, so that it must
be considered whether United States courts may take jurisdiction of acts per-
formed on foreign soil, even though those acts are legal where performed. Even
if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, that is, if the ultimate test
is to be the effects on United States commerce regardless of the location of the
individual act involved, there yet remains the question of what action our courts
may take to restrain the illegal activity engaged in outside the limits of their
jurisdiction.
LOCATION OF THE ACCUSED Acrxvrry
Whether an American statute is to be construed as applying to acts com-
mitted abroad is not a question of congressional power but rather one of
congressional intent.1 Normally, where a law does not immediately affect
national interest it is construed to apply within the jurisdiction only, unless
Congress has specifically provided otherwise.2 The question, then, is what
powers did Congress intend to confer on our courts for the enforcement of
antitrust laws.
At first the Supreme Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying
to activity engaged in outside of the United States. In Avxricasz Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co.3 the defendant, as part of a larger plan to monopolize the
tropical fruit market, induced the Puerto Rican Government to seize a planta-
tion and a railroad owned by its competitor, the plaintiff, who brought suit
under the Sherman Act. In affirming the lower court's holding that no cause
of action would lie, the Supreme Court wrote: "In the first place the acts
causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of the
United States and within that of other states. It is surprising to hear it argued
that they were governed by the act of Congress." 4 Thus the Supreme Court
1. Blackner v- United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8. "It
is ... unquestioned that a sovereignty has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to
protect itself from and to punish as crimes certain acts which are pcculiarly injurious to
its rights or interests or those of its citizens wherever committed, at least if committed by
a citizen or subject of such sovereignty." 15 CJ.S., Conflict of Laws § 6 (1939).
2. Blackmer v. United States, supra note 1; American Banana Co. v. Unitcd Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347 (1909).




took pains5 to announce the rule that where the acts in restraint of trade
were committed within a foreign jurisdiction, they would not fall under the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act.
As American corporations became more involved in international business,
however, the courts found this rule too confining. Therefore, later cases, seiz-
ing upon the fact that in the American Banana case all of the accused acts
had been performed outside the United States, took jurisdiction even though
the acts were performed partly,6 or even principally, within another jurisdiction
so long as some acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were performed within
the United States.
In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,7 for example, a conspiracy had been
entered into in the United States to control the import and sale of sisal from
Mexico, and to monopolize internal and external commerce in that commodity.
A group of American banks had combined to organize an American company,
which in turn had established Mexican sales agents. Aided by discriminatory
legislation in Mexico this combination was able to force other buyers out of
the sisal market. Though almost all of the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
were performed in Mexico, the court distinguished the American Banana case
on the grounds that here the conspiracy was "made effective" by acts done
within the United States. Actually these decisions were tacitly recognizing
that "effects on United States commerce" were the controlling factor, but they
continued to pay lip service to the rule requiring some activity within the
United States in furtherance of the conspiracy.8 While this rule has never
been expressly overruled, it has become meaningless in light of the complex
activities of today's corporations. Now, even where the accused activity is
entirely outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, our courts
will take jurisdiction if they find that is effect is to restrain our commerce.0
With regard to the place where the conspiracy was entered into, there has
never been much conflict. It has been consistently held that where a conspiracy
affects United States commerce, jurisdiction will not be denied because the
idea was first formulated in another country.' 0
S. The case did not have to be decided on this ground. See the district court and
court of appeals opinions: 160 Fed. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), 166 Fed. 261 (2d Cir. 1908).
6. United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry., 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
7. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
8. Ibid.; Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 344 U.S. 280
(1952).
9. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Branch
v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944); cf. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911),
where the Court wrote: "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm
as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within Its
power." In the American Banana case the Court found that it was conjectural what ef-
fects, if any, were felt within the United States. Therefore, the case can be reconciled on
its facts with the later cases. In its underlying rationale, however, it is entirely contra.
10. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Thomsen v. Cayser,
243 U.S. 66 (1917).
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Thus far, we have considered the situation where the court will take juris-
diction over the foreign conduct of a domestic corporation. Where the de-
fendant is not a United States citizen but a citizen of a foreign country, the
same tests are applied. It was early held that our courts may control his
activities abroad whenever the courts can acquire personal jurisdiction over
him." In United States v. Aluminum Co. of Ancricax' it was held that such
activities of a foreign national may be enjoined by our courts where they
are intended to and do restrain our commerce.
LEGALITY UNDER FoREIGN LAW
The basic policy underlying American antitrust law is that the interests of
the public are best safegnarded in a competitive economy. The public policy
of most other industrial nations, however, is not in accord.1a Indeed, the en-
vironment in many European countries is quite favorable to the development
of monopolies and especially to those large combinations popularly known as
cartels.' 4 Where an American company becomes involved in an international
cartel designed to divide world markets among its members, a conflict between
the United States policy and that of other nations may well arise.15 Normally,
agreements by the foreign members of the cartel are not in violation of the
laws of their own country and such agreements, entered into on foreign soil,
may well be valid where made. But where the effect of the agreement is to
restrain the import or export trade of this country then it contravenes the pro-
visions of the Sherman Act.' What action our courts may take to enforce
the public policy of this country while at the same time not interfering with
the right of the other nations to formulate their own policy in respect to com-
merce, is a problem that has perplexed American jurists since the Sherman
Act was first enacted.
In the American Banana case the Supreme Court wrote: "A conspiracy in
this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those
acts and make them unlawful, if they are permitted by the local law."' 7 The
act complained of, though procured by defendant, had been performed by a
foreign sovereign on land over which it had de facto jurisdiction. Though the
above quotation has often been cited to establish that our courts will not take
jurisdiction over foreign acts if they are legal where performed, the case more
11. United States v. Pacific & Axctic Ry., 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
12. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
13. See Note, Extraterritorial Antitrust Problems, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1452 (1956).
14. See Kronstein & Leighton, Cartel Control, 55 Yale L.J. 297 (1946); Timberg,
International Combines and National Sovereigns, 59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 575 (1947).
15. Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws,
63 Yale L.J. 639 (1954); Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the
Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale L.J. 655 (1954).
16. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., S3 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949),
modified on appeal, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp.
513 (S.D.XNY. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
17. 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909).
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properly stands for the proposition that our courts, in enforcing the antitrust
laws, cannot interfere with the acts of a foreign sovereign.18
In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.19 the acts performed in Mexico were
aided by discriminatory laws on the part of the Mexican Government. In
reversing dismissal of the complaint, the Supreme Court distinguished the
American Banana case in these words: "The United States complain of a viola-
tion of their laws within their own territory by parties subject to their juris-
diction, not merely of something done by another government at the instiga-
tion of private parties. True, the conspirators were aided by discriminating
legislation, but by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they brought
about forbidden results within the United States.120
Although our courts may take jurisdiction even when the acts abroad are
legal where performed, a problem may arise where the decree interferes with
the rights of foreign nationals who are not before the court. It is here that
conflicts with the laws of other nations may arise. The foreign courts cannot
be expected to grant comity to an American decree which violates the rights
of their citizens by attempting to enforce a policy not in accord with their
own. 21 The possibility that the decree will not be recognized by a foreign
court is a practical one to be considered when the decree is framed, but does
not constitute a bar to the court's jurisdiction.
DEGREE OF RESTRAINT INVOLVED
When determining the legality of international cartels, the courts generally
apply the same tests as are used in regard to domestic combinations. 22 When-
ever two or more companies combine and agree not to compete in each other's
territories, the result, at least as between themselves, must be a restraint of
trade. When an American company is a party to such an agreement, the effect
is to curtail some portion of America's export trade. Of course if the company
occupies a dominant position in the American market, then most or all of
America's export trade in that line of commerce may well be stifled. Such a
restraint would necessarily be unreasonable2 3 Often, the territorial agreements
are accompanied by so-called "patents and processes agreements" whereby the
parties agree to exchange, on an exclusive basis, all inventions, improvements
and discoveries which the members then hold or may obtain, along with what-
18. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 44 (1934).
19. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
20. Id. at 276; cf. Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 334
U.S. 280 (1952); Ramirez & Ferand Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp.
594 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
21. See British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. [1955] 1 Ch.
37 (1954).
22. But see Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in United States v. Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
23. "No citation of authority is any longer necessary to support the proposition that a
combination of competitors, which by agreement divides the world into exclusive trade
areas, and suppresses all competition among the members of the combination, offends the
Sherman Act." United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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ever technical information is needed to utilize them.2 4 The parties to such an
agreement are put into so strong a competitive position that they will probably
have the power to exclude any potential competitors from their territory. On
the other hand where a company holds less than a dominant share of the
market, it could be argued that, rather than creating an unreasonable restraint
on competition, such agreements give an American company access to foreign
inventions and discoveries which will benefit the American consumer. Never-
theless, since our antitrust laws are founded on the premise that the consumer
is benefited most by free competition, division of territories agreements may
well be unreasonable per se.2 And where they are accompanied by a patents
and processes agreement the threat of growing monopoly which they present
would almost certainly put them in contravention of our antitrust policy.-"0
Often, however, the defendant contends that due to high tariffs and trade
barriers it would be impossible for him to compete in the foreign markets in
any event 27 If this contention is proven to be true, then, of course defendant
cannot have restrained America's foreign commerce because there would be no
foreign commerce to restrain. - s If, on the other hand, it is not impossible, but
only difficult for defendant to compete, then our courts will not read ex-
ceptions into the Sherman Act.20
THE DECREE
At the heart of effective antitrust enforcement is the framing of a decree
which will prevent future violations. Here too, the complexities of large inter-
national combinations have forced the courts to abandon confining rules in
favor of practical effects. The combinations involved in the early cases were
comparatively simple and the courts were able to enjoin a single line of activity.
An international cartel on the other hand, normally involves varied activities
within several countries, covering many years. In framing its decree, the
court must consider each contract, agreement and operation. The effect of
each on the over-all scheme must be weighed and then the court must decide
how best to deal with it. Normally the defendant is enjoined either from com-
plying with or from enforcing the territorial agreements'g Exclusive license
agreements which were found to be in furtherance of the illegal conspiracy
have been cancelled or enjoined and the defendant ordered to license on a
non-exclusive basis.3 ' American courts have undertaken to cancel contracts
24. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); United States v. Tinken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
25. See Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 US. 211 (1899); Att'y Gen.
Rep. to Study the Antitrust Laws 26 (1955).
26. United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954).
27. See, e.g., the argument before the Court in Holophane Co. v. United States, 25 U.S.L.
Week 3141 (Nov. 13, 1956).
28. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 95S (D. Mass.
1950).
29. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).





between an American defendant and a foreign citizen not before the court. 2
And on occasion dissolution of a foreign subsidiary has been ordered.33
But the operation of the American decree may well be thwarted by the
failure of foreign courts to give it recognition. In United States v. Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd.34 the defendant was sued abroad to prevent com-
pliance with the American decree. The district court had enjoined the Im-
perial company, a British concern over whom it had personal jurisdiction, from
asserting its patent to prevent the importation of nylon polymer and nylon
yarn into Great Britain and further ordered it to grant licenses on a non-exclu-
sive basis only. An exclusive licensing contract between the Imperial company
and the Nylon Spinners company, an English concern not personally before
the court, had been entered into in England and involved an English patent.
Therefore, when the Nylon Spinners company sued the Imperial company in
England for anticipatory breach of this contract, the English court refused to
grant comity to the United States decree on the ground that it represented
an attempt by an American court to exert an extraterritorial jurisdiction which
it did not have over a contract governed by English law.35 The British court
enjoined the Imperial company from complying with the American decree and
also granted specific performance of the contract.83
This case illustrates a practical limitation of the in personam power of a
court of equity. A saving clause in the American decree prevented defendant
from being further prosecuted for a failure beyond his control, to comply with
the decree. Therefore, defendant had not been seriously injured. If he had been
put to some expense in defending the action in England, that would be one of
the penalties to be borne by one who violates the antitrust law. On the other
hand, it is always possible that no suit will be brought abroad or that if it is
brought the foreign court will recognize our decree.
The trend has been toward greater liberality in the employment of the
court's equity powers. In no case have the courts gone so far as in United
States v. Holophane Co. 37 where the district court not only enjoined defendant
from complying with or enforcing the restrictive agreements but, further,
32. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
33. Ibid. But see the concurring opinion in United States v. Timken Roller Bearing
Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
34. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), decree 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
35. British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch.
19 (CA. 1952) (interlocutory decree); [1955] 1 Ch. 37 (1954) (final decree).
36. The district judge had foreseen the possibility of action by the English court.
In his opinion on remedies, dated May 16, 1952, he wrote: "What credit may be given
to such an injunctive provision by the courts of Great Britain . . . we do not venture
to predict. We feel that the possibility that the English courts in an equity suit will
not give effect to such a provision in our decree should not deter us from including it ...
If the British courts were not to give credit to this provision, no injury would have been
done; if the holding of the British courts were to the contrary, a remedy available would
not have to be needlessly abandoned." United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.,
Civil No. 24-13 (S.D.N.Y.) 27.
37. 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.M. Ohio 1954).
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ordered defendant to perform certain affirmative acts in the territories of the
foreign members of the cartel, 3s in a reasonable effort to compete. These acts
included advertising and the circularizing of defendant's products to dis-
tributors in those territories.39 The affirmative aspects of this extraordinary
decree were recently affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court."0
A saving clause in the decree provided that the defendant would not be
required to export any of its products "in violation of the valid patent or
trade-mark or trade name rights of any person in any foreign countries."
Nevertheless, defendant might well be subject to suit within England and
France for violating its contracts not to compete there. Should this occur it
is fair to infer that defendant, having acted reasonably would not be required
to violate openly foreign court orders in complying with the American decree."'
CONCLUSION
Though the first case to construe the foreign commerce clause of the Sher-
man Act held that Congress had not intended to give it extraterritorial ap-
plication, the courts soon began to accept jurisdiction over foreign activities
in restraint of United States commerce, where some acts within this country
had furthered the conspiracy. Today, the sole test is what effect will the
questioned activity have on United States trade. Our courts have come to
recognize that America's foreign commerce cannot be protected if its antitrust
enforcement must stop at the border. In addition the trend has been toward
greater flexibility and practicality when framing the decree, consistent with
the modem view that equity may order as well as restrain.
There is no doubt that this is the direction in which this country's law has
been moving. However, strong voices have been heard in dissent, among them
men prominent in the American bar. 2 They decry what they proclaim to be
America's attempt to use its industrial prowess in order to foist its antitrust
policy on other nations. The recent antitrust decisions are, they maintain,
examples of "judicial aggression." They point to the Impeal Ccmical case
and the adverse reaction to our decree in England and CanadaP3 as indications
that our courts have been overstepping themselves and indeed as indications
that our antitrust policy is causing us to lose friends abroad.
33. For the Holophane decree see CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1954 Trade Cas.) 67679
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 1955).
39. See the argument on appeal from the Timken decision 19 U.S.L. We1: 3291, where
the Government contended that the effect of the order would be to require Timken to enter
the foreign market and sell abroad, bearings manufactured in this country.
40. Holophane Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
41. See argument on appeal, 25 U.S.L. Week 3141 (Nov. 13, 1956).
42. Whitney, Antitrust Law and Foreign Commerce, 11 Record of the ,sZociation of
the Bar of the City of New York 134 (1956); Haight, International Law and Extraterri-
torial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale L.J. 639 (1954); Whitney, Sources of
Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale LJ. 655 (1954);
N.Y. Herald Tribune, July 1, 1957, § 2, p. 3, col. 1.
43. British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch.
19, 24 (CA. 1952); Toronto Globe & Mail, Aug. 20, 1952, p. 6, col. 1.
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Surely it cannot be denied that this country has no right to force foreign
nations to adopt its commercial policies. Thus, cartel agreements which do
not unreasonably restrain our foreign commerce are simply none of our
business.
However, this country does have a right to follow its own policy in regard
to commerce. It has the further right to require that domestic companies
remain in a free competitive position in their dealings with foreign companies
and to require that these corporations do not raise artificial barriers against
this country's import and export trade. Notwithstanding the fact that foreign
countries may pursue their own commercial policy, which may not agree with
ours, we may require that domestic companies remain aloof from cartel
agreements which restrict our commerce. Where such agreements are found,
their continuance may be enjoined. Because often an effective decree cannot
be framed without interfering with the rights of citizens of other countries, it is
inevitable that occasionally the courts of those countries will step in and pre-
vent the operation of one or another aspect of our decrees. Nevertheless, this
is no reason why our courts should refrain from framing their decrees in the
way that will best enforce our antitrust policy. Of course, some saving clause
should be incorporated into the decree to insure that the defendant will not
find himself in the unhappy situation of being bound by conflicting orders of
the courts in two jurisdictions.
In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., the district court
noted that the Nylon Spinners company had knowingly participated in a con-
tract violative of our antitrust laws. Usually foreign corporations are not
unaware of this country's commercial policy. If they choose deliberately to
enter contracts in contravention of it, they cannot complain if our courts take
action to terminate such transactions.
This nation cannot enforce two antitrust policies, one that is strict against
companies involved in purely domestic combinations and one more liberal in
favor of those whose entanglements reach beyond our borders. Our policy must
remain constant and uniform. It follows, therefore, that America's courts must
do all in their power to keep its import and export trade free from monopolistic
influences just as they do all in their power to preserve interstate commerce
from such influences.
[Vol. 26
